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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the moderating role of customer dependence in relationship marketing. Data 
were obtained from a sample of 289 wealth managers. The findings indicate that a relationship 
model is more adapted in the high dependence context than in the low dependence context in 
which a transactional model is more suitable. 
 
Dependence is regarded by various researchers as central in explaining relationships. However, 
despite this recognition, the direct effect of dependence on trust and commitment has been shown 
to be relatively small. Such a small effect may be the result of a wrong specification of the effect 
of dependence, which may not be a direct effect, but a moderating one. In this paper, we thus 
hypothesize and empirically test the moderating effect of dependence. More specifically, we 
propose a moderating effect of dependence on the relationship between trust-building factors, 
such as a salesperson’s characteristics and the characteristics of the relationship and the 
perceptions of quality and satisfaction, as well as on the relationship between perceived quality 
and satisfaction. These moderating effects are tested within an extended relationship model 
including trust, commitment, and relationship outcomes. We test these hypotheses in the context 
of the relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts, where the wealth managers’ 
dependence is exacerbated by the intangible nature and the credence properties of the financial 
analysts’ services. The results of the study should provide useful insight into how dependence 
can be incorporated into customer relationships management by service firms. By better 
understanding the effects of dependence, managers can take steps to develop better relationships 
with their customers, as well as helping them to understand when a transactional approach would 
be more suitable. 
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 THE MODERATING ROLE OF DEPENDENCE IN RELATIONSHIP MARKETING: 
AN EXAMPLE FROM THE WEALTH MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY 
 
This paper examines the moderating role of customer dependence in relationship marketing. 
Survey data were obtained from a sample of 289 Swiss wealth managers. The findings indicate 
that certain characteristics of suppliers, such as expertise and responsiveness, have a stronger 
effect on perceived quality and customers’ satisfaction under a high level of dependence more 
than under a low level of dependence. They also indicate that perceived quality has weaker effect 
on satisfaction under a high level of dependence. Managerial implications of managing quality, 
satisfaction, trust, and commitment in dependence relationships are also discussed. 
 
Keywords: Relationship Management, Dependence, Wealth Management Industry 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the very nature of their activities, firms in the financial services industry are highly exposed to 
conflicts of interest. In particular, those conflicts which arise in the “research equity” business 
have long been recognized to be among the most intractable (e.g., Walter, 2004). Despite the data 
availability of past financial analysts’ recommendations and earnings estimates, as well as the 
ranking of financial analysts by the media based on past performance, wealth managers have, at 
best, a partial knowledge of the quality of the advice they receive. Among others things, this 
quality depends, at the same time, on the personal skills of the financial analysts, the timeliness of 
the recommendations they make, and the fairness of the provider, whereas the contribution of 
each is difficult to disentangle. This problem of information asymmetry creates a dependence 
relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts (Mills 1990; Mishra, Heide, & Cort, 
1998). 
 
On the one hand, wealth managers who recognize this dependence are seeking to establish closer 
relationships with financial analysts in order to reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior (Berry, 
1995; Gwinner et al., 1998; Mills, 1990; Wathne & Heide, 2000). In response to this demand for 
closer relationships, financial analysts have developed relationship-building activities to improve 
the quality of their relationship with wealth managers and to increase the use of their financial 
research. For financial analysts, the consequences of enhanced relationship are increased revenue 
(through broking commissions), reduced user acquisition costs, and lower costs of serving repeat 
users, leading to greater profitability (Reichheld, 1993; Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). 
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On the other hand, wealth managers do not want to become too close to their financial analysts, 
because it could generate conflicts of interest detrimental to their relationship with their own 
customers–i.e., the investors. As financial analysts may have some interest in recommending 
certain stocks or in revising their recommendations all too frequently, it is crucial for investors 
that wealth managers maintain a certain level of distance vis-à-vis financial analysts. 
 
In such a situation in which there is tension between seeking and resisting relationship, it is 
important to better understand the role of dependence in the relationship between financial 
analysts and wealth manager. In this paper, we argue that the dependence perceived by wealth 
managers upon their financial analysts influences the way they evaluate financial market research 
and their usage behavior. When they perceive themselves as being relatively independent from 
their financial analysts, wealth managers tend to evaluate financial market research based on the 
outcome (i.e., by evaluating and comparing financial analysts past performance and advice 
quality). On the other hand, when they feel they are dependent, they tend to use relationship-
based criteria, such as satisfaction with past experience and trust, for their evaluation. 
 
Dependence is regarded by various researchers as central in explaining the importance of trust 
and commitment in relationships (Andaleeb, 1995, 1996; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1962; Frazier, 1983; Heide & John, 1988). However, despite this recognition, the direct 
influence of dependence has been shown to be relatively small (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar 
1998). Such a small effect may be the result of a wrong specification of the influence of 
dependence, which may not be a direct effect, but a moderating one (Andaleeb, 1995, 1996; 
Geyskens et al., 1996; Van Bruggen, Kacker, & Niewlaat, 2005). For example, the friendliness of 
financial analysts may have a stronger impact on wealth managers’ satisfaction when dependence 
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is high than when dependence is low. In this paper, we thus hypothesize and empirically test the 
moderating effect of dependence. More specifically, we propose that dependence moderates the 
relationship between relationship-building factors, such as a analyst’s characteristics and the 
characteristics of the relationship and the perceptions of quality and satisfaction, as well as on the 
relationship between perceived quality and satisfaction. These moderating effects are tested 
within an extended relationship model including trust, commitment, and relationship outcomes to 
control for possible confounding effects. 
 
An argument often made in the relationship marketing literature (e.g., Andaleeb, 1996; Blau, 
1964; Emerson, 1962; Heide & John, 1988) is that there is no relationship without a certain level 
of dependence. This means that when customers are relatively independent from their supplier, 
relationship marketing may be less effective as customers use outcome-based criteria to evaluate 
services and decide upon their behaviors. In such a rational context, trust and commitment may 
have less impact on customer behavior (Coviello et al., 2002; Day, 2000). Therefore, we also 
hypothesize that the explanatory power of the relationship building factors and the perception of 
quality and satisfaction is stronger in a high dependence context, than it is in a low dependence 
context. 
 
We test these hypotheses using structural equation modeling on data obtained from wealth 
managers about their relationship with financial analysts. We selected this context because the 
relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts embodies some common 
characteristics important for relationship marketing, such as commitment and trust (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). Furthermore, wealth managers’ dependence on financial analysts is exacerbated by 
the intangible nature and the credence properties of the financial analysts’ services (Mishra et al., 
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1998; Ostrom & Iacobucci, 1995; Zeithaml, 1981). Our results support most of our hypotheses 
and contribute to the literature in a number of meaningful ways. First, we develop and test a 
relationship-marketing model in which dependence is integrated as a moderator. This enables us 
to better understand how dependence can influence the relationships between constructs such as 
satisfaction, trust, and commitment. By incorporating dependence as a moderating variable, we 
also investigate the boundary conditions of relationship marketing in order to understand when a 
more transactional/rational approach would be more suitable than a relationship approach to 
predict customer usage behavior. A better understanding of the moderating role of dependence 
furthermore offers important implications for managers by providing practical guidelines as to 
how dependence can be incorporated into customer relationships management. By better 
understanding the effects of dependence, managers can take steps to develop closer relationships 
with their customers. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first present our theoretical model and the 
hypotheses to be tested. Second, we describe the context of financial market research and the 
important role of dependence in this specific context. Third, the data collection method and the 
measures are described and the results of the empirical study are presented. Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of the managerial implications of our findings and the limitations of our study. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesized model depicted in Figure 1 is grounded in theories of relationship marketing 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpandé, 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) and 
power-dependence (Andaleeb, 1995, 1996; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962). The model posits a 
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sequential one-way causal flow from relationship-building factors, via service quality and 
satisfaction, to trust and commitment, and finally to relationship outcomes. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
 
The rationale for this model lies primarily in Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh’s (1987) pioneering article on 
relationship development, which adopts a longitudinal perspective on relationships. According to 
this perspective, relationship-building factors, service quality and satisfaction, and trust and 
commitment are formed during the subsequent phases of relationship development. Quality 
perception and satisfaction tend to develop over the short term as a result of past interactions, 
trust takes relatively longer to develop and has a more expectational quality to it, and finally 
commitment develops over the long term and is future-oriented (Geyskens et al., 1999). On this 
basis, we hypothesize that relationship-building factors positively influence perceived quality and 
satisfaction, which in turn influence trust and commitment. Perceived quality, satisfaction, trust, 
and commitment subsequently influence relationship outcomes. 
 
Because the focus in this paper is on the moderating role of dependence on the relationships 
between the constructs of the model, and because the direct relationships in the model have been 
extensively investigated and tested, in the following paragraph, we only briefly define the 
constructs and present these relationships with their associated hypotheses (see Table 1). We, 
then, focus on the effect of dependence. 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 22) identify commitment and trust as being the central elements 
required when developing a successful relationship. They argue that “commitment and trust are 
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“key” because they encourage marketers to (1) work on preserving relationship investments by 
cooperating with exchange partners, (2) resist attractive short-term alternatives in favor of the 
expected long-term benefits of staying with existing partners, and (3) view potentially high-risk 
actions as being prudent because of the belief that their partner will not act opportunistically.” 
Trust can be defined as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has 
confidence (Moorman et al., 1993) and relationship commitment as an enduring desire to 
maintain a valued relationship (Moorman et al., 1992). In a customer-supplier context, such as 
the relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts, the characteristics of the 
suppliers (i.e., the financial analysts) and the characteristics of the relationship with these 
suppliers are two important relationship-building factors, which are both used by wealth 
managers in order to form their perceptions of the financial analysts’ trustworthiness (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Mayer et al., 1995). In turn, these relationship-building factors influence 
perceived quality and satisfaction, which then influence trust (Dwyer et al., 1987; Geyskens et al., 
1999). Customer satisfaction is the customer’s affective overall evaluation based on the total 
purchase and consumption experience with a service over time (Anderson, Fornell, & Lehmann, 
1994) and service quality is defined as the customer’s cognitive evaluation of the provider’s 
service performance, based on his or her prior experiences and impressions (Hennig-Thurau, 
Gwinner, & Gremler 2002). Trust influences relationship commitment and relationship outcomes 
that are both future-oriented (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). In the context of the relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts, 
which is a continuously provided service, an important relationship outcome is the level of 
utilization of market research, because customers choose future service usage levels on the basis 
of their evaluations of their current service experience, and these usage levels have a substantial 
impact on the long-term profitability of the organization (Bolton & Lemon, 1999). Utilization of 
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market research is defined following Moorman et al. (1992), as the extent to which the research 
influences wealth managers’ decision making. 
 
Table 1 summarizes these hypothesized direct relationships with the references that theoretically 
and empirically support these relationships (Hypotheses 1 to 13). Now, we would like to turn our 
attention to dependence and its moderating role. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
Dependence can be defined as the extent to which one partner relies on the relationship for the 
fulfillment of important goals (Emerson, 1962; Frazier, 1983; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).  
 
Dependence, or more specifically the perception of dependence, is particularly important within 
the relationship between wealth managers and financial analysts. Wealth managers recognize 
that, to a certain extent, they are dependent from their financial analysts to achieve their own 
performance objectives. In order to decrease the negative effects of such a dependence, which is 
due to the risk of opportunistic behavior from part of financial analysts, they seek to improve 
their relationship with them. However, because dependence may be detrimental to their 
relationship with their own customers, the investors, they try to maintain a certain level of 
independence by evaluating and diversifying their sources of information (i.e., reducing their 
trust in and commitment towards their financial analysts. 
 
Some wealth managers may feel dependent because they do not have the ability to switch from 
one analyst to another. In addition, the critical importance of the research provided by financial 
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analysts may vary across wealth managers and therefore, the level of dependence may also differ, 
and hence, the importance of their relationship with the financial analyst. 
 
Despite the recognized importance of the role of dependence in buyer-seller relationships, 
empirical results are far from conclusive. Several studies have found that there is a direct effect of 
dependence on trust and relationship commitment (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Ganesan, 
1994; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995). However, a meta-analysis by Geyskens et al. (1998) 
estimated that the effect is rather small and highly variable, which may cast some doubt on the 
validity of this direct effect. On the other hand, in a series of experiments, Andaleeb (1995, 1996) 
found a significant interaction effect of dependence and trust on satisfaction and relationship 
commitment. Geyskens et al. (1996) also found an interaction effect of dependence and trust on 
commitment. Their argument is as follows: dependence has a positive effect on relationships 
when trust is present. These studies, however, were interested in the effect of dependence across 
levels of trust. Nevertheless, we believe that trust and commitment are only important in the 
building of successful relationships, when a minimum level of dependence is present. When there 
is no dependence, customers are more likely to use outcome-based evaluation criteria rather than 
relationship-based criteria. More recently, Van Bruggen, Kacker, and Nieuwlaat (2005) 
hypothesized an interaction effect of dependence and functional variables on relationship quality. 
To better understand the moderating effect of dependence, we focus our study on the effect of 
trust building factors across varying levels of customers’ (i.e., wealth managers) perceptions of 
dependence upon their service suppliers (i.e., financial analysts). 
 
First, we hypothesize that dependence positively moderates the relationships between the 
characteristics of the supplier and perceived quality and satisfaction, and that dependence also 
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positively moderates the relationships between the characteristics of the relationship and 
perceived quality and satisfaction. A highly dependent party in a relationship has higher stakes in 
the relationship and is generally wary of exploitation by the more powerful partner (Geyskens et 
al., 1999; Heide & John, 1988). Therefore, relationship-building activities by the more powerful 
partner has a bigger impact on the dependent partner’s objectives and moves it substantially 
closer to the attainment of its own goals, leading to a higher satisfaction and a better assessment 
of service quality by the latter (Van Bruggen et al., 2005). Moreover, the powerful partner has 
weakened incentives to improve the relationship since it has lower stakes in the outcomes of the 
relationship. It is expected to do little to increase satisfaction and perception of service quality. 
Therefore, relationship-building activities from the more powerful partner is unlikely to be 
expected by the more dependent partner. When this powerful partner is non-exploitative and fair 
and develop relationship-building activities, dedication to the partner should grow and 
satisfaction and perception of service quality should improve (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; 
Geyskens et al., 1996; Van Bruggen et al., 2005). Following this line of argumentation, highly 
dependent wealth managers may expect opportunistic behavior from their financial analysts 
(Geyskens et al., 1999, Gundlach & Cadotte, 1997). However, if financial analysts benevolently 
send relationship-building signals to wealth managers, these wealth managers will be positively 
surprised and the signals (i.e., the relationship-building factors) will have a strong positive impact 
on their satisfaction and perception of quality. On the other hand, in a context of low dependence, 
the financial analysts are not expected to try to take advantage of their customers given that the 
latter have, for example, a number of alternative suppliers available. In such a context, 
relationship-building behaviors may be perceived as being calculative and self-interested (i.e., 
analysts try to establish trust and commitment only as a means of gaining the loyalty of their 
customers) and thus these relationship-building behaviors have less of a positive impact on the 
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wealth managers’ perceptions of quality and satisfaction. In view of the above argument, we 
would expect that relationship-building factors (i.e., financial analysts’ and relationship’s 
characteristics) possess varying levels of impact depending on the degree of dependence 
perceived by the wealth managers. 
 
This argument is consistent with power distance reduction theory (Mulder, 1971, 1977), which 
states that individuals strive to reduce the power distance (i.e., dependence) between themselves 
and more powerful people and that the smaller the distance from the more powerful, the stronger 
the tendency to reduce it. When wealth managers perceive that they are not too dependent from 
their financial analysts, they strive to reduce even more their dependence (the power distance) 
and therefore, relationship-building activities from financial analysts, which may lead to more 
dependence (Mulder, 1971), have a smaller effect on perceived quality and satisfaction. When 
wealth managers are very dependent upon their financial analysts, they tend to give up the idea to 
reduce this dependence (the power distance) and accept the relationship building activities from 
financial analysts, which become more effective on their perceived quality and satisfaction. 
Therefore, we hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 14: The characteristics of the analysts and the characteristics of the relationship 
will have a stronger impact on perceived quality and satisfaction under a high 
(rather than a low) level of perceived dependence. 
 
Second, we hypothesize that dependence negatively moderates the relationship between 
perceived quality and satisfaction. Satisfaction is a positive affective state resulting from the 
appraisal of all aspects of the wealth managers’ relationship with their financial analysts (e.g., 
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Geyskens et al., 1999; Oliver, 1993). Perceived quality is the wealth managers’ cognitive 
evaluation of the analysts’ service performance, based on their prior experiences and impressions 
(Hennig-Thurau et al., 2002). The relationship between cognition and affect is well-documented 
in the attitudinal literature (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). However, Zajonc and Markus (1982) have 
shown that the relative importance of affective and cognitive factors may vary depending on 
context. We believe that in a high dependence context, because there is less of a choice, due to a 
lack of alternatives, affective factors (e.g., satisfaction) may play a more important role than 
cognitive factors. In a low dependence context, because wealth managers can choose between 
several alternatives, the effect of cognitive factors (e.g., perceived quality) may be more 
important. On the one hand, in a high dependence context, the level of the wealth managers’ 
satisfaction may not be very sensitive to perceived quality, and on the other, in a low dependence 
context, perceived quality will trigger a strong affective response and it will have a strong impact 
on satisfaction. More specifically, we hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 15: Perceived quality will have a weaker impact on satisfaction under a high 
(rather than a low) level of perceived dependence. 
 
Finally, as noticed by several authors (e.g., Andaleeb, 1996; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Heide & 
John, 1988), the development of a relationship requires a minimal level of dependence . 
Customers, who are dependent upon their supplier, will seek to develop a long-term relationship 
with this supplier because the risks associated with the dependence are reduced (Ganesan, 1994; 
Lusch & Brown, 1996). Less dependent customers may prefer a more transactional approach to 
their interactions with their supplier in order to avoid becoming too dependent upon them. As 
they continuously evaluate the different offers available on the market (Dwyer et al., 1987), they 
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will rely less on trust and commitment. This view is supported by Garbarino and Johnson (1999), 
who found that the relationships between satisfaction, trust, and commitment vary along the 
transactional-relational continuum. Accordingly, we hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 16: The explanatory power of the variables in the model depicted in Figure 1 will 
be stronger in the high dependence context than in the low dependence one. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
Context 
To test the hypotheses, we chose the financial services industry and the relationship between 
wealth managers and financial analysts for empirical analysis because it embodies some common 
characteristics important for relationship marketing in services, such as commitment and trust 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Such an approach is consistent with prior research on service 
relationship that has investigated one particular industry (e.g., Lam et al., 2004). Focusing on a 
particular industry allows us to customize items in our questionnaire to suit the characteristics of 
the studied industry and elicit more accurate responses. For example, we can capture all the 
attributes of a construct, such as perceived quality, that are important for a particular industry. 
Single industry focus also helps to improve internal validity and could reduce the error variance 
and hence increase the power of our hypothesis testing (Lam et al., 2004). 
 
The services provided by financial analysts are investment advice (e.g., buy, hold, and sell 
recommendations), firms’ future earnings estimates (expected earnings forecasts), and market 
research reports that help wealth managers when making their investment decisions. It is 
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provided on a regular basis by phone, face-to-face, or via e-mail. Research reports typically 
present graphs, figures, and explanations about companies’ business. The aim of these reports is 
to increase the credibility of the investment advice produced by the financial analysts. Wealth 
managers who use financial market research implicitly consider that financial analysts are better 
informed than they are about firms’ future prospects. Wealth managers use these services in order 
to reduce the uncertainty and risks surrounding critical investment decisions. 
 
To reduce the perceived risk in evaluating such services characterized by a high level of 
intangibility and credence properties (Zeithaml, 1981), wealth managers often seek close and on-
going relationships with financial analysts (Berry, 1995; Gwinner et al., 1998; Mills, 1990; 
Wathne & Heide, 2000). One important characteristic of these relationships is the level of 
dependence perceived by wealth managers. Despite the number of financial research suppliers 
available on the market, some wealth managers may not be able to easily switch from one 
supplier to the other. In particular, wealth managers who work for banks that produce their own 
research in-house may be required to use internal research. The number of alternative suppliers is 
also limited for wealth managers whose portfolios contain stocks that are not covered by a large 
number of analysts (e.g., small caps). Furthermore, the critical importance of the research 
provided by financial analysts may vary across wealth managers. In other words, some investors, 
such as those who manage portfolios containing a wide range of different securities and those 
who have limited material (e.g., databases, financial software such as Bloomerg or Reuters) or 
human resources (e.g., administrative and managing assistants) available in order to help them in 
their daily tasks, may have to rely more on analysts’ advice than others. Because of this 
dependence and the risk of opportunism from financial analysts associated with it, a number of 
wealth managers highly value long-term trusting relationships with their financial analysts. 
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Data Collection 
The data used to test the hypotheses was collected during the first semester of 2003 through a 
mail survey of Swiss wealth managers. These wealth managers are all members of the two Swiss 
professional associations from which we obtained their mailing addresses. A survey instrument 
was sent to a sample of 1,154 wealth managers with a cover letter including a brief description of 
the study and its purpose and a self-addressed prepaid envelope. To encourage high response, the 
cover letter stressed the academic nature of the research and the support by the professional 
associations. At first, four and then eight weeks after the first mailing, non-respondents were sent 
a second, respectively a third mailing. 
 
By eliminating those who indicated that the questionnaire was not relevant to their firm, the 
original sample size was reduced to 1,091. Of those eligible wealth managers, 289 or 26.48% 
responded. The response rate did not vary across geographic regions. To assess non-response 
bias, we also compared early and late respondents with respects of scale items (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977). Only 2 out of 37 items displayed a statistically significant difference. Overall, 
these results suggest that non-response bias is not a significant problem in our data. 
 
Measures 
The survey instrument was developed on the basis of the prior literature to ensure construct and 
nomological validity and interviews with wealth managers establish the face validity of the 
constructs (Ping, 2004). The pre-test of the questionnaire involved two separate steps. First, to 
assess the face validity of the scale items, we conducted 10 interviews during which we asked 
wealth managers to complete a draft version of the questionnaire and to express their opinions 
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concerning the appropriateness and answerability of the items. This procedure helped us to refine 
and adapt the items to the context of financial market research. In a second step, a sample of 20 
randomly selected wealth managers was asked to fill out our survey, which enabled us to test the 
internal consistency, uni-dimensionality of our scales. 
 
Following recent research in services and customer relationship marketing (e.g., Lam et al., 2004; 
Zeithaml et al., 1996), we collected self-reported measures of all the constructs. Situational 
factors such as non-availability of services may affect the accuracy of measuring behavioral 
consequences based on panel data (Bass, 1974). Self-reported measures are less affected by these 
factors and thus have an advantage over the measures based on panel data (Lam et al., 2004) 
 
The measures were adapted from previous studies in order to fit with the context of financial 
market research. Relationship commitment was operationalized on the basis of a validated scale 
previously used by Moorman et al. (1992). The items used to measure dependence were adapted 
from the items used as manipulation checks by Andaleeb (1995). We measured two dimensions 
of trust: credibility and benevolence. Credibility was measured by five items adapted from Doney 
and Canon (1997) and Moorman et al. (1992) and benevolence was measured by four items 
adapted from Ganesan (1994). In order to measure wealth managers’ satisfaction, three items 
developed by Sharma and Patterson (2000) were used. The five items related to perceived quality 
were developed for this study because of the specificities of the services provided by financial 
analysts. The relationship-building factors were operationalized through two constructs, which 
were considered important by Doney and Canon (1997): the characteristics of the financial 
analysts and the characteristics of the relationship. Two dimensions of the analysts’ 
characteristics were measured: expertise and responsiveness. The expertise items were adapted 
18. 
from Doney and Canon (1997) and those used for measuring responsiveness from Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry (1988). Finally, the characteristics of the relationship were measured on four 
dimensions: business contact frequency, social contact frequency, friendliness, and similarities, 
which were all operationalized on the basis of validated scales developed by Doney and Canon 
(1997). Following Moorman et al. (1992), utilization of market research was measured as the 
percentage of investment recommendations from his financial analyst that the wealth manager 
followed. All the items were measured on 7-point Likert scales except for market research, which 
is measured through a percentage. Table 2 presents the items used for each of the model 
constructs. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Measurement Model 
We purified our measures using exploratory factor analysis and reliability analysis. We retained 
items with high loadings on the intended factors and no substantial cross-loading. We then 
subjected the set of items to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to verify the hypothesized factor 
structure. Consistent with some previous studies involving single-item constructs (e.g., Cadotte et 
al., 1987; Lam et al., 2004), we fixed the indicator loading of the utilization of market research 
measure to be one and its error variance to be zero. Table 2 presents measurements properties of 
the constructs. As evidence of convergent validity, the CFA results indicate that each item loaded 
on its hypothesized factor with large and significant loadings (all but four larger than .6 as 
recommended by Bagozzi and Yi (1988)). A stronger test to assess convergent validity is to 
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examine the average variance extracted (AVE) by each factor (Fornell and Larker, 1981; Ping, 
2004). All the AVE exceed the recommended value of .5, providing support for the convergent 
validity of the measures. Although, the final measurement model has a significant chi-square of 
172.46 with 89 degrees of freedom (p < .001), this is not unusual with a large sample size 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Other fit indexes are a comparative fit index (CFI) of .958, a Tucker-
Lewis index (TLI) of .944, and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .058 
(90% CI of .045 to .071): all are satisfactory. All indexes meet or exceed the critical values for 
good model fit (Bentler, 1990; Bollen, 1989; Browne & Cudeck, 1992). The reliability of the 
scales is assessed using coefficients alpha (Cronbach, 1951) and composite reliability coefficients 
(Werts et al., 1974). As shown in Table 2, all the coefficients, but two (those for dependence), 
exceed the recommended .7-level (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Nunnally, 1978; Ping, 2004). 
 
Evidence for the discriminant validity of the measures was provided in three ways. First, none of 
the 95 percent confidence intervals of the individual elements of the latent factor correlation 
matrix contained a value of 1.0. Second, a series of chi-square difference tests were conducted for 
each pair of constructs between the constrained model (i.e., one in which the correlation between 
constructs was fixed at 1.0) and the unconstrained model. In all of the cases, the unconstrained 
model provided a significantly better fit the data than did the constrained model (p < .01). Third, 
the shared variance between pairs of constructs was always less than the corresponding AVE, 
providing additional evidence of the discriminant validity of our construct measures (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). These results in toto support the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
measures used in the study. 
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As all the data were perceptual and were collected from the same source at the same time, there is 
a possibility of common method bias (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2003). We, 
however, tried to minimize the potential effect of this bias through the design of the study. To 
create a proximal or methodological separation between the measurement of our independent and 
dependent variables, we used different response formats as recommended by Podsakoff et al. 
(2003). We used Likert scales to measure independent and mediating variables and we used 
percentage to measure utilization of market research, our dependent variable. Following the 
recommendations of Podsakoff et al. (2003), we also conducted several tests to determine the 
potential biasing effect of common method variance. First, a single-factor test revealed that the 
32 items in our study load on 8 separate factors, with the first factor accounting for only 32.2% of 
the variance of the items. Second, a repeat of the single-factor test using CFA revealed that the 32 
items do not load on a single factor. The fit statistics for this model (χ2 = 902.081, df = 104, p < 
.001, TLI = .539; CFI = .601, RMSEA = .166 [90% CI of .156 to .176]) are significantly worse 
than the CFA results of the measurement model. Finally, in a more stringent test, we examined 
our final structural model by allowing all items to load on a single first-order methods factor in 
addition to their theoretical constructs. The structural parameter estimates from this model 
differed from those reported in our final model by no more than .011 (most were the same or 
varied only by .005). Likewise, none of the t-values changed enough to alter the results of our 
hypothesis tests. Furthermore, the fit statistics for this model (χ2 = 1109.024, df = 790, p < .001), 
TLI = .931; CFI = .943, RMSEA = .031 [90% CI of .025 to .037]) are similar to the results of the 
final model reported below. In this most stringent test, the results suggest that a common method 
bias does not affect the parameter estimates reported herein. 
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In order to be able to test the moderating role of dependence, we split the sample into two groups 
of high and low dependence by running an exploratory factor analysis with the three items 
measuring dependence, and using the factor score as an indicator of dependence. This indicator 
was then used to split the sample into two groups of equal size (median split). The mean value 
and standard deviation of this indicator for the high dependence group is 3.742 and .853. For the 
low dependence group, these values are 1.851 and .582, respectively. The level of dependence 
between the two groups is significantly different with a t-value of 21.833 (p-value < .001). 
Moreover, none of the correlations between dependence and the model variables is significant. 
The matrix of the correlations between the constructs is presented in Table 3 for the two groups. 
Furthermore, the wealth managers in the two groups vary significantly in the length of their 
relationship with their analysts. Wealth managers in the high dependence group, those to whom 
advice from financial analysts is of critical importance and who feel that they only have a limited 
number of available alternative suppliers (Andaleeb, 1995; Heide & John, 1988), maintain, on 
average, longer relationships (55.21 months, SD = 35.66) with their financial analyst than the 
wealth managers in the low dependence group (70.54 months, SD = 60.95), the difference being 
statistically significant (Difference t-test, t = 2.50, p = .013; Wilcoxon non-parametric test, z = 
6.49, p = .000 ). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
Structural Model 
We fit the proposed model simultaneously with the high dependence and the low dependence 
groups using multiple-group path analysis (Bentler, Lee, & Weng, 1987). Initially, we held all 
paths invariant across the low and high dependence groups and estimated a fully restricted model 
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as a baseline model (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). Subsequently, on the basis of the Lagrange-
multiplier test (LM test), we sequentially released paths with significant test statistics until further 
freeing up of constraints failed to enhance the model fit. The final model is significantly better 
than the fully restricted one (χdif2  = 21.020, F = 3.503, p < .001). The resultant coefficients are 
presented in Table 4 and the structural model is graphically depicted in Figure 2. Indicators of 
overall fit (χ2 = 1176.940, df = 868, p < .001), relative fit (TLI = .920; CFI = .930) and absolute 
fit index (RMSEA = .037 [90% CI of .031 to .042]) indicate a good fit, especially for a model 
with such a large number of constructs. Regarding the coefficient of determination, R2 ranged 
from .140 to .680 for the low dependence group and from .216 to .676 for the high dependence 
group indicating that the proposed model explains a significant amount of variance in both 
contexts. Five out of six coefficients of determination for the dependent variables are 
significantly larger in the high dependence group than in the low dependence one (all z-tests with 
Fisher ζ transformation of r (Cohen et al., 2003) are significant at p < .01), supporting H16. This 
means that our relationship marketing model better explains why wealth managers use of 
financial market research for the high dependence group, in which wealth managers tend to favor 
longer term relationships, than for the low dependence group, in which wealth managers prefer 
shorter, more output-based relationships. 
 
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about Here] 
 
Table 4 provides the estimated unstandardized, standardized coefficients and other associated 
statistics for the hypothesized relationships for the high and low dependence groups based on the 
multiple-group analysis. Because we draw comparisons and identify similarities across high and 
23. 
low dependence groups, we focus on unstandardized coefficients for our interpretation1 (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Bentler, 1995; Hair et al., 1998). 
 
In regard to the utilization of market research, it appears that the service quality and relationship 
commitment yielded a significant and positive effect, while benevolence yielded a significant but 
unexpectedly negative effect. The effects for satisfaction and credibility were not significant (at p 
< .05). As per H2 and H4, perceived quality and commitment had significant, positive and 
consistent effects across dependence groups (β = .094 and .060 respectively2). However, while 
the effect of satisfaction on utilization of market research is positive and consistent across the two 
dependence groups (β = .019), it is not significant. This does not support H1. Concerning trust, 
the effect of credibility varies across the two dependence groups, but it is not significant in either 
of the two contexts. This provides no support for H3a. Finally, we hypothesized that the effect of 
benevolence on the utilization of market research would be positive. Our results show a 
significant but negative effect, which is consistent across dependence groups, providing no 
support for H3b. This surprising negative sign for this relationship may have resulted from the 
timing of the data collection. The data was collected in 2003 during a ‘bear market’ period during 
which several financial analysts were accused of unfair practices, thus the negative effect may be 
due to an asymmetric effect of benevolence similar to the dominant “negativity” effect (i.e., a 
unit negative performance has a stronger effect than a unit positive performance), identified by 
                                                 
1  The standardized coefficients are useful for determining relative importance, but are sample specific and not 
comparable across sample. The unstandardized coefficients correspond to the regression weights in multiple 
regression in that they are expressed in terms of the construct’s scale, in this case its variance. This makes these 
coefficients comparable across samples and retains their scale effect (Hair et al., 1998). 
2  In regard to the utilization of market research, the unstandardized coefficients appear relatively low compared 
to the other dependent variables; it is due to the nature of the variable used which is a percentage. 
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Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol (2002) for the same benevolence dimension of trust). 
 
Concerning relationship commitment, all constructs yielded significant and positive effects, 
except credibility. As per H5 and H6b, satisfaction and benevolence had significant, positive and 
consistent effects across dependence groups (β = .244 and .439 respectively). However, while the 
effect of credibility on relationship commitment is positive and consistent across dependence 
groups (β = .064), it is not significant. This does not support H6a. Whereas, we did not 
hypothesize any direct effect of similarity on relationship commitment, we found a strong 
positive effect in both groups. The effect is also significantly stronger in the low dependence 
group than in the high dependence one (β = .562 and .271 respectively). Our finding that 
similarity directly influenced relationship commitment without being mediated by satisfaction 
may have been influenced by the way we measured relationship commitment. We only measured 
the affective component of commitment and not its calculative component (Geyskens et al., 
1996). Therefore, familiarity being defined as the wealth manager’s beliefs that the financial 
analyst shares interests and values with him (Doney & Canon, 1997), it is possible for wealth 
managers to be committed to their relationship with the financial analysts that they perceived 
similar, even if they are not fully satisfied with their services. 
 
In regard to the two dimensions of trust, all constructs yielded significant positive effects except 
for perceived quality on credibility. As per H7a and H8a, satisfaction and perceived quality have 
significant, positive, and consistent effects across dependence groups on credibility (β = .264 and 
.365 respectively). Satisfaction has also a significant, positive, and consistent effect on 
benevolence (β = .575, p < .05). This gives support for H7b. However, while the effect of 
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perceived quality on benevolence is positive and consistent across dependence groups (β = .227), 
it fails to reach significance (t = 1.937, p < .10 but > .05). This offers weak support for H8b. 
 
As far as satisfaction is concerned, the effects of responsiveness and social contact frequency are 
significant, positive, and consistent across dependence groups. The effect of perceived quality is 
only significant and positive for the low dependence group and the effect of expertise is only 
significant and positive for the high dependence group. The effects of friendliness, similarity and 
business contact frequency are not significant. H9 posited a significant and positive effect of 
perceived quality on satisfaction and H15 posited that the effect would be stronger in the low 
dependence group than it would be in the high dependence group. The effect is significant in the 
low dependence group (β = .460), but not in the high dependence group (β = .128), giving 
support to both H9 and H15. As per H10 and H14c, the effect of the analysts’ characteristics was 
hypothesized to be positive and stronger in the high dependence group. While the effect of 
responsiveness is consistently significant, providing some support for H10, it is only significant 
for the high dependence group, providing some support for H14c. H12 posited a positive effect of 
relationship characteristics on satisfaction and H14b, that the effect would be stronger in the high 
dependence group. While social contact frequency has a significant, positive, and consistent 
effect across dependence group, supporting H12 but not H14b, friendliness, similarity, and business 
contact frequency have no significant effects at 5%. The effect of friendliness varies, however, 
across dependence groups. While it is non-significant in the low dependence context, it just fails 
to reach significance in the high dependence context (β = .174, t = 1.934, p < .10 but > .05), 
offering weak support for H14b. 
 
26. 
In regard to perceived quality, social contact frequency has a significant positive, and consistent 
effect across dependence groups (β = .101, p < .05), supporting H13 but not H14a. While the effect 
of similarity is positive and consistent across dependence groups (β = .123), it fails to reach 
significance (t = 1.856, p < .10 but > .05). This offers weak support for H13. None of the effects 
of responsiveness, friendliness, and social contact frequency are significant. As per H11, expertise 
has a significant and positive effect on service quality. Moreover, the effect is stronger in the case 
of high dependence supporting H14a (β = .329 and .499 respectively). Tables 5 summarizes these 
results. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
 
DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion 
The results provide substantial support for the model of Figure 1 and for the moderating role of 
dependence. Eleven out of thirteen hypotheses concerning direct relationships are supported. 
More importantly, the strength of several relationships varied across the two dependence contexts 
providing support for H14 and H15. 
 
The moderating effect of dependence on the relationships between relationship-building factors 
and satisfaction and perceived quality is supported by financial analysts’ characteristics. The 
moderating effect of dependence on the relationship between perceived quality and satisfaction 
was also strongly supported. These results suggest that the relative importance of affective and 
cognitive factors varies across the dependence contexts (Zajonc & Markus, 1982). In the low 
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dependence context, perceived quality, a cognitive factor, strongly affects satisfaction, an 
affective factor, when in the low dependence context, perceived quality has no significant effect 
on satisfaction. These findings contribute to the development of relationship marketing research 
by showing the importance of the moderating effect of dependence on the impact of different 
types of factors, cognitive and affective, in the development of service relationships. 
 
In support of H16, the explanatory power of the model is stronger in the high dependence context 
than it is in the low dependence one. This result suggests that, in the absence or at a low level of 
dependence, relationship commitment and trust alone may not be strong enough to prevent a 
partner from seizing attractive short-term alternatives despite the expected long-term benefits 
from staying with the existing partner. This is corroborated by the significant difference in the 
length of the relationship between wealth managers and analysts across the two groups. As 
noticed by Andaleeb (1996), some degree of dependence is needed to establish a trusting 
relationship. In the case of low dependence, customers may not be willing to establish a long-
term relationship with their supplier for fear of becoming dependent upon their financial analysts. 
Financial analysts dealing with less dependent wealth managers who do not wish to establish a 
long-term relationship should develop a more output-based marketing approach (Coviello et al., 
2002), emphasizing objective measure of quality and performance of their research reports. These 
results support Day’s (2000, p. 24) observation that “investing in or building close relationships 
is neither appropriate nor necessary for every market, customer, or company.” 
 
Managerial Implications 
The confirmation of the moderating role of dependence has some other important implications for 
financial analysts. First, it suggests that some wealth managers, particularly those who feel 
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dependent upon their financial analysts, are responding positively to relationship marketing 
strategies, whereas those who are less dependent are not so influenced by such strategies. This 
has important implications for segmenting the market. Financial analysts do not directly charge 
investors for research. Wealth managers generally receive research from several providers and 
they are free to choose who they would like to work with. However, there is an informal 
agreement between financial analysts and wealth managers, which is that the latter direct a part of 
their securities transactions to the brokerage house that provides them with investment research. 
This practice of exchanging research services for broking commissions is commonly referred as 
“soft dollar payments.” As a consequence, a particular wealth manager must regularly pass orders 
through the bank’s trading room in order to generate a profit for the brokerage house employing 
the financial analyst. Less dependent wealth managers who do not want to maintain a long term 
relationship with their financial analyst may not find this profitable. By segmenting wealth 
managers based on their level of dependence and by focusing on those more dependent who are 
seeking long-term relationships, financial analysts may improve brokering commissions. 
 
To increase the wealth managers’ utilization of market research, financial analysts can spend 
their efforts on improving relationship-building factors such as their level of responsiveness and 
the frequency of business and social contacts they have with them. For instance, financial 
analysts may provide wealth managers with the opportunity to visit a company’s management; 
they can also organize public conferences for them. Financial analysts should also frequently 
telephone and call on wealth managers; they can even invite them to social events, such as, 
cocktail parties and golf tournaments. 
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Second, less dependent wealth managers are less sensitive to such relationship strategies. Instead, 
they attach more importance to the quality of the market research, and this is evaluated based on 
financial analysts’ past advice. Based on past advice, wealth managers can do what the profession 
calls “back-testing.” It is to construct a “fake” portfolio as if past advice had been followed in 
real time and then to measure the financial performance of this portfolio, and therefore the 
performance of the financial analyst (Womack, 1996). Another approach for evaluating the 
quality of past advice consists in estimating the accuracy of earnings forecasts defined as the 
difference between the realized earnings and the estimates which were made previously (Brown, 
2001 for recent evidence). Finally, a wealth manager can rely on analysts’ and banks’ rankings 
published by financial journals such as the ‘Institutional Investor’s Magazine’ and the ‘Wall 
Street Journal.’ Whatever the method, past performance is generally a good predictor of future 
performance. To satisfy and increase market research use by less dependent wealth managers, 
financial analysts should therefore pay a close attention to the quality and accuracy of their 
forecasts and advice, this being more important than relationship building strategies for this type 
of wealth managers. In such an output-based context, financial analysts may also decide to 
directly charge wealth managers for their research reports. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our study has several limitations that offer opportunities for future research. One of these 
limitations is the cross-sectional design which was employed. In any model in which causality is 
suggested, longitudinal studies provide stronger inferences. However, the use of panel data would 
have significantly reduced the size of our sample. Nevertheless, the model we developed and 
tested would benefit from being tested in a longitudinal design. 
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A second possible limitation is the sole reliance on data collected from wealth managers rather 
than dyadic data from wealth managers and financial analysts. However, because wealth 
managers were the dependent party in the relationship studied and we were interested only in 
explaining wealth managers’ use of research, the reliance on wealth managers seemed entirely 
reasonable. Furthermore, financial analysts would probably not have been able to report 
accurately the extent of their power toward each of the wealth managers they have a relationship 
with. 
 
A third limitation was the context of our study, financial market research. The specificities of the 
financial market research were particularly suitable for testing the moderating effect of 
dependence. On one hand, our research focus on one industry helps keep unexplained variance 
(“noise”) small in our model estimation and hence, increase the power of hypothesis testing. On 
the other hand, such a narrow focus may limit the global significance of our results. Future 
research may replicate our study in other industries. 
 
Fourth, further investigations on the negative relationship between benevolence and utilization of 
market research are needed. We have proposed that such a negative effect may have been caused 
by an asymmetric effect due to the bad situation of the financial markets at the time of the data 
collection. Such an asymmetric effect needs to be empirically tested. The surprising direct 
relationship between similarity and relationship commitment also needs further theoretical and 
empirical investigations. 
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Finally, variables such as the reputation of the firm employing the financial analysts that we did 
not examine in this study could moderate the relationships between some constructs within our 
model. Developing a favorable reputation involves a significant investment and therefore 
represents a valuable asset that would make providers of financial research reluctant to jeopardize 
by acting opportunistically. For example, when the reputation of a provider is high, the 
relationship between relationship-building factors and trust in the financial analyst is likely to be 
strengthened. In contrast, when its reputation is low, the impact of relationship-building factors 
on trust in the financial analyst may be nullified. These issues merit further research. 
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TABLE 1:  Summary of the Hypotheses about the Direct Relationships 
Nr. Hypotheses Examples Theoretical and Empirical Supports 
H1 Overall satisfaction positively influences relationship outcomes. Anderson et al., 1994; Cronin et al., 2000; Garbarino & 
Johnson, 1999; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2002; Oliver, 1980 
H2 Perception of service quality positively influences relationship outcomes. Boulding et al., 1993; Cronin et al., 2000; Zeithaml et al., 
1996 
H3 Trust positively influences relationship outcomes. Doney & Cannon, 1997; Dwyer et al., 1987; Ganesan, 1994; 
Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994 
H4 Relationship commitment positively influences relationship outcomes. Dwyer et al., 1987; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2002; Moorman et 
al., 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994 
H5 Overall satisfaction positively influences customers’ relationship commitment. Dwyer et al., 1987; Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Sharma & 
Patterson, 2000 
H6 Trust positively influences customers’ relationship commitment. Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Geyskens et al., 1998, 1999; 
Moorman et al., 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994 
H7 Overall satisfaction positively influences customers’ trust. Dwyer et al., 1987; Ganesan, 1994; Garbarino & Johnson, 
1999; Geyskens et al., 1999 
H8 Service quality positively influences customers’ trust. Anderson & Narus, 1990; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Kumar et 
al., 1995 
H9 Service quality positively influences customers’ overall satisfaction. Anderson et al., 1994; Cronin et al., 2000; Cronin & Taylor, 
1992; Kennedy et al., 2001 
H10 Analyst characteristics positively influence customers’ overall satisfaction. Kennedy et al., 2001; Williams & Hazer, 1986 
H11 Analyst characteristics positively influence customers’ service quality perception. Cronin & Taylor, 1992; Parasuraman et al., 1988; 
Parasuraman et al., 1991 
H12 Relationship characteristics positively influence customers’ overall satisfaction. Geyskens et al., 1998; Kennedy et al., 2001; Williams & 
Hazer, 1986 
H13 Relationship characteristics positively influence customers’ service quality perception. Cronin & Taylor, 1992; Crosby et al., 1990; Parasuraman et 
al., 1988; Parasuraman et al., 1991 
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TABLE 2.  Survey Items and Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
Construct Construct Items Loading t-value CR AVE α 
Overall Satisfaction If I had to do it all over again, I would choose the same analyst. 
I am very satisfied with my current choice of analyst. 
I feel good about my decision to choose this analyst. 
.900 
.812 
.910 
—a 
12.689 
15.773 
.834 .627 .988 
Perceived Quality* How did this analyst compare with other on each of these criteria: 
 Consistency of the recommendations with my investment goals. 
 Clarity of the potential risk associated with the different recommendations. 
 Improvement of my portfolio performance. 
 Quality of synthesis. 
 
.843 
.691 
.721 
.608 
 
— a 
7.996 
8.370 
6.932 
 
.842 
 
.520 
 
.855 
Credibility I trust my analyst to do things I can’t do myself. 
I trust my analyst to do things my team can’t do itself. 
.921 
.927 
— a 
7.600 
.828 .708 .925 
Benevolence My analyst has made sacrifices for me in the past. 
My analyst cares for me. 
Even if I do not pass orders through my analyst’s bank for a while, he/she will still 
continue to care for me. 
.746 
.683 
.600 
— a 
6.925 
6.171 
.778 .514 .742 
Relationship 
Commitment 
I consider my analyst to be part of my team. 
I am committed to my relationship with my analyst. 
I really care about the future of my professional relationship with my analyst. 
.773 
.706 
.632 
— a 
7.835 
6.989 
.796 .533 .774 
Expertise My analyst is very knowledgeable. 
My analyst knows the companies/markets/economies/industries he follow very well 
.908 
.816 
— a 
9.563 
.735 .581 .838 
Responsiveness My analyst is not always willing to help me. (R) 
My analyst is too busy to respond to my request promptly. (R) 
.843 
.795 
— a 
6.932 
.663 .501 .772 
Business Contact 
Frequency** 
My analyst spends considerable time getting to know my team and/or my clients. 
My analyst frequently visits me at my office. 
My analyst takes a lot of time to understand my needs. 
.927 
.598 
.619 
— a 
6.020 
6.601 
.785 .527 .743 
Social Contact 
Frequency** 
We talk about family, sports, or other personal interests. 
We talk about common interests besides work. 
We meet out of the work place. 
We get together primarily to have fun. 
.832 
.890 
.562 
.589 
— a 
9.823 
5.894 
5.753 
.765 .515 .839 
42. 
Friendliness My analyst is always nice to me. 
My analyst is friendly. 
.838 
.927 
— a 
7.490 
.791 .666 .905 
Similarity My analyst is very similar to me. 
My analyst has values similar to mine. 
My analyst shares the same interests as me. 
.844 
.819 
.699 
— a 
9.894 
8.287 
.743 .501 .818 
Dependence Getting research from my analyst is critical to my job. 
Finding a replacement for my analyst would be very difficult. 
My alternative sources of investment research are limited. 
.688 
.601 
.530 
— a 
8.662 
7.655 
.609 .449 .618 
Use of Market 
Research*** 
In my opinion, the proportion of investment recommendations provided by my analyst 
that I have followed is: (__%) 
1.000 — a — — — 
Model Fit Indices χ2 = 172.46 (p < .001), df = 89, χ2/df = 1.938 
TLI = .944, CFI = .958 
RMSEA = .058 (90% CI of .045 to .071) 
     
NOTE: CR = Composite Reliability, AVE Average Variance Extracted. 
1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, except: * 1 = much worse than other, 7 = much better than other, ** 1 = never, 7 = always, *** % 
aValues were not calculated because loading was set to 1.000 to fix construct variance 
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TABLE 3.  Intercorrelations between the Study Constructs 
 Utiliz. Commit. Credib. Bene. Satis. Quali. Expert. Respon. Friend. Simil. Bus. Co. Soc. Co.
Utilization  .300 .203 .318 .424 .839 .390 .373 .187 .337 .252 .163 
Commitment .345  .279 .491 .483 .373 .420 .293 .181 .488 .414 .317 
Credibility .364 .305  .228 .409 .264 .366 .245 .070 .209 .251 .204 
Benevolence .245 .599 .270  .511 .401 .371 .421 .287 .371 .487 .337 
Satisfaction .369 .611 .364 .630  .542 .444 .559 .213 .324 .382 .419 
Quality .517 .410 .350 .422 .531  .518 .406 .253 .437 .387 .278 
Expertise .396 .385 .466 .354 .586 .594  .435 .311 .485 .412 .209 
Responsiveness .136 .367 .192 .439 .505 .328 .339  .339 .323 .344 .292 
Friendliness .054 .326 .140 .422 .399 .249 .203 .486  .257 .347 .166 
Similarity .367 .487 .342 .526 .506 .500 .440 .357 .368  .305 .339 
Business Contacts .144 .486 .076 .451 .446 .344 .199 .354 .382 .492  .343 
Social Contacts .275 .393 .158 .347 .316 .368 .183 .180 .133 .503 .443  
High Dependence in the lower matrix; Low Dependence in upper matrix. Correlations larger than .1 are significant at a 5% level. 
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Table 4.  Estimated Structural Coefficients 
   Low Dependence  High Dependence  
Dependent variables Independent variables R2 Coeff.* Sd. Error  t       R2 Coeff.* Sd. Error  t Diff. (LM test) 
Utilization  .324    .344     
 H1 Satisfaction  .019 (.103) .019 1.038  .019 (.113) .019 1.038  
 H2 Quality  .094 (.382) .022 4.234  .094 (.365) .022 4.234  
 H3a Credibility  -.012 (-.083) .012 -1.005  .021 (.121) .015 1.441 Diff. 
 H3b Benevolence  -.058 (-.335) .021 -2.751  -.058 (-.303) .021 -2.751  
 H4 Commitment  .060 (.400) .018 3.304  .060 (.343) .018 3.304  
           
Commitment  .680    .662     
 H5 Satisfaction  .244 (.196) .106 2.297  .244 (.252) .106 2.297  
 H6a Credibility  .064 (.067) .056 1.149  .064 (.065) .056 1.149  
 H6b Benevolence  .439 (.381) .112 3.909  .439 (.403) .112 3.909  
Not hypothesized Similarity  .562 (.435) .120 4.700  .271 (.246) .107 2.528 Diff. 
           
Credibility  .140    .216     
 H7a Satisfaction  .264 (.201) .096 2.750  .264 (.268) .096 2.750  
 H8a Quality  .365 (.213) .145 2.523  .365 (.246) .145 2.523  
           
Benevolence  .420    .589     
 H7b Satisfaction  .575 (.535) .086 6.682  .575 (.648) .086 6.682  
 H8b Quality  .227 (.161) .117 1.937  .227 (.170) .117 1.937  
           
Satisfaction  .476    .676     
 H9 Quality  .460 (.352) .139 3.309  .128 (.085) .179 .713 Diff. (H15) 
 H10a Expertise  .055 (.050) .116 .471  .521 (.372) .159 3.268 Diff. (H14b) 
 H10b Responsiveness  .301 (.318) .078 3.871  .301 (.259) .078 3.871  
 H12a Friendliness  -.082 (-.065) .101 -.810  .174 (.142) .090 1.934 Diff. (H14b) 
 H12b Similarity  .040 (.038) .078 .509  .040 (.035) .078 .509  
 H12c Business Contacts  .058 (.076) .059 .991  .058 (.056) .059 .991  
 H12d Social Contacts  .152 (.217) .044 3.448  .152 (.196) .044 3.448  
           
Quality  .449    .613     
 H11a Expertise  .320 (.382) .090 3.545  .499 (.535) .099 5.027 Diff. (H14a) 
 H11b Responsiveness  .085 (.117) .064 1.325  .085 (.110) .064 1.325  
 H13a Friendliness  -.061 (-.063) .061 -1.011  -.061 (-.075) .061 -1.011  
 H13b Similarity  .123 (.154) .066 1.856  .123 (.163) .066 1.856  
 H13c Business Contacts  .101 (.174) .050 2.002  .101 (.147) .050 2.002  
 H13d Social Contacts  .051 (.095) .037 1.366  .051 (.099) .037 1.366  
           
Model Fit Indices χ2 = 1176.494 (p < .001), df = 868, χ2/df = 1.356, TLI = .920, CFI = .930, RMSEA = .037 (90% CI of .031 to .042) 
* Unstandardized coefficient followed by standardized coefficient. 
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TABLE 5:  Summary of the Results 
Nr. Hypotheses Results 
H1 Overall satisfaction positively influences relationship outcomes Not supported 
H2 Perception of service quality positively influences relationship outcomes Supported in both low and high dependence groups 
H3 Trust positively influences relationship outcomes Not supported 
H4 Relationship commitment positively influences relationship outcomes Supported in both low and high dependence groups 
H5 Overall satisfaction positively influences customers’ relationship commitment Supported in both low and high dependence groups 
H6 Trust positively influences customers’ relationship commitment Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (b) benevolence; not supported 
for (a) credibility 
H7 Overall satisfaction positively influences customers’ trust Supported in both low and high dependence groups for both (a) credibility and (b) 
benevolence 
H8 Service quality positively influences customers’ trust Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (a) credibility; weakly supported 
in both low and high dependence groups for (b) benevolence 
H9 Service quality positively influences customers’ overall satisfaction Supported in the low dependence group, not supported in the high dependence group 
H10 Analyst characteristics positively influence customers’ overall satisfaction Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (b) responsiveness; not 
supported in the low dependence group, supported in the high dependence group for (a) 
expertise 
H11 Analyst characteristics positively influence customers’ service quality 
perception 
Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (a) expertise; not supported for 
(b) responsiveness 
No H Similarity (an analyst characteristic) positively influence customers’ relationship 
commitment 
Supported in both low and high dependence groups 
H12 Relationship characteristics positively influence customers’ overall satisfaction Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (d) social contacts; weakly 
supported in the high dependence group only for (a) friendliness; not supported for, (b) 
similarity, and (c) business contacts 
H13 Relationship characteristics positively influence customers’ service quality 
perception 
Supported in both low and high dependence groups for (c) business contacts; weakly 
supported in both low and high dependence groups for (b) similarity; not supported for 
(a) friendliness and (d) social contacts 
H14 The characteristics of the analysts and the characteristics of the relationship will 
have a stronger impact on perceived quality and satisfaction under a high (rather 
than a low) level of perceived dependence 
Partially supported. Expertise only has a significantly different effect across dependence 
groups on both perceived quality and satisfaction 
H15 Perceived quality will have a weaker impact on satisfaction under a high (rather 
than a low) level of perceived dependence 
Supported 
H16 The explanatory power of the variables in the model depicted in Figure 1 will 
stronger in the high dependence context than in the low dependence one 
Supported 
Supported means significant at 5%, weakly supported means at 10%. 
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